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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FOREIGN-TRADE AGREEMENTS AND PRICE-SUPPORT PROGRAMS
Edwin G. Martin*
Since 1933, the federal government has made price supports available
directly to the producers of agricultural commodities During most of
this period, the laws have contained provisions implicitly recognizing
that imports might nullify our domestic price-support efforts. It was not
until quite recently, however, that there has been effective debate in the
Congress to demonstrate the conflict between the tariff-reduction program
under the Trade Agreements Act of 19342 and the price-support programs.
The price-support programs have been accompanied by various controls
and other measures, including acreage restrictions, marketing agreements
and orders on both regional and national bases, school-lunch programs,
export subsidies, and direct loans on and purchases of "surplus" commodities for removal from usual market channels, sometimes for destruction of the surplus. This article selects the loan and purchase support
programs for analysis in the light of the trade-agreements program for
two reasons: (a) they are the simplest forms of program; and (b)
they apply to the greater part of our agricultural production.
Although our government maintained agricultural price supports for
several years before World War II and in the same period negotiated
several tariff-reduction agreements, it was not until after the war that
actual conflicts developed between the two programs. From the beginning
of the trade-agreements program, much stress has been placed on the
necessity of obtaining from foreign countries tariff concessions on the
agricultural products of which we produced an exportable surplus. The
prewar trade agreements permitted restrictions on imports to prevent
them from interfering with our domestic price-support programs, whether
or not those programs included restrictions on the production or marketing
of domestic products. During the war there were two important policy
changes concerning price supports and trade agreements. First, the
levels of price supports were raised considerably and many more products
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, page 69, for biographical data. This article
expresses, of course, the personal views of the author.
1 For authoritative analyses of price-support laws enacted during and after the War
(including the Agricultural Act of 1948), see Shields, Federal Statutory Provisions Relating
to Price Supports for Agricultural Commodities, 12 U. or Cm. L. REv. 64 (1944); Shields
and Schulman, Federal Price Support for Agricultural Commodities, 34 IowA L. REy. 188
(1949).
2 48 STAT. 943, 19 U.S.C. 1351 (1946).
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were granted mandatory supports. Support at not less than 90 percent
of parity was guaranteed on many commodities for two years after
hostilities. Second, the Administration embarked on a greatly expanded
program of more liberal international trade policies. It set out to achieve
a substantial reduction of tariffs and the abolition of import quotas
to the greatest extent possible. It narrowed the field in which we reserved
the right to impose quotas to protect our domestic programs.
At the end of the war, our domestic import-control law (Section 22
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended 3 ) was applicable to
protect certain domestic programs, but not others. It did not embrace
the programs established by the wartime legislation. When Congress
in 1948 amended Section 221 to embrace all agricultural programs, it
added a new provision prohibiting use of Section 22 in contravention of
international agreements. Meantime, our postwar international agreements
had restricted our freedom of action to put quotas on imports. Most of
the products granted price support as a result of wartime developments
were not subject to programs which qualified them for protection by
import quotas under the postwar agreements. Furthermore, these
agreements provided for reduced tariffs on imports of many directly
competitive products.' The conflict of principles between our tradeagreements program and our price-support program finally came to a
head in 1951 during Congressional consideration of a bill to continue
the trade-agreements program.
Both the protective tariff and the direct-purchase price support operate
to increase the price received by the domestic producer over what it
would be if the forces of free trade were allowed to prevail. The tariff
does this by imposing a duty on imports of competitive products. This
duty increases the price of the import and thereby permits the domestic
product to be sold at a higher price than that prevailing in the foreign
country where costs of production are lower. The price-support program
operates to remove from usual domestic market channels a quantity
of the domestic product determined to be "surplus." Unless this surplus
is taken from the market, it will depress the price below the price-support
goal-usually a stated percentage of "parity." Accordingly, an agency
of the federal government, the Commodity Credit Corporation, purchases
the surplus.
It is clear then that the objectives of the tariff and of price supports
3 54 STAT. 17, 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1946).
4 62 STAT. 1248 (1948), 7 U.S.C.A. § 624 (Supp. 1950).
5 For example, butter, eggs, potatoes, wheat, wool, and soybeans.
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are basically the same, although the details of their operation necessarily
differ. It would seem equally clear that a tariff cut on a commodity
may be at cross purposes with a price support on the same commodity.
On the one hand, the price support is removing "surplus" domestic
goods from the market, and on the other hand the tariff cut is enabling
supplies of competitive foreign goods to enter the market either in
additional quantities or at lower prices. The result of the tariff cut
is to make more difficult and expensive the operation of the price-support
program. The usual result is "some" expansion of the scope of the
domestic program-diversion from the market of additional domestic
goods. The word "some" in the preceding sentence is not intended to
suggest either "great" or "trifling." Administration proponents of the
Trade-Agreements Program implicitly admit the conflict of principles
between tariff cuts and price supports when they argue that imports
of products similar to those under price supports are not very significant
in the light of the -over-all scope of the respective programs.6 Members
of Congress who view the trade-agreements program in a less rosy
light seem disinclined to agree that the conflicts are trifling.
PREwAR AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION REGARDING ImPORTs
The Agricultural Adjustment Act,' enacted in 1933, provided. inter
a/ia for a system of processing taxes on basic commodities with the
proceeds to be used for making benefit payments to domestic producers
thereof. Since this system increased the cost of goods processed from
such basic commodities, Congress protected the domestic processors
by imposing a compensating tax on imports of processed articles.' Without
the compensating tax on imports, foreign processors who operated exempt
from the processing tax might have made serious inroads into our domestic
markets, especially in the case of cotton textiles. Except for the compensating taxes, the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act did not contain
any provision for control of imports. This may have been an oversight
due to the rush of completing the legislation., In passing, it might be
noted that in the National Industrial Recovery Act, passed a month
later, Congress authorized the President to restrict imports whenever
6 Testimony of Secretary of Agriculture Brannan, Hearings before Finance Committee
on H.R. 1612, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1951).
7 48 STAT. 31 (1933), 7 U..C. §§ 601-20 (1946).
8 Section 15(e) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 STAT. 39 (1933), 7 U.S.C. 615(e)
(1946).

9 The Agricultural Act became law on May 12, 1933, little more than two months after
inauguration of the Roosevelt Administration.
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necessary to prevent them from interfering with the Codes of Fair
Competition promulgated for the various industries.'0
Two years later, Section 22 was added to the Agricultural Adjustment
Act." This section directed the President to impose quotas on imports
whenever he found them to be necessary to prevent such imports from
interfering with any program under the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
The law provided that the United States Tariff Commission should
make investigations to aid the President in carrying out Section 22.
By Executive Order 2 the President directed that requests for investigations be filed with the Secretary of Agriculture who would advise the
President when he considered Tariff Commission investigation to be
necessary. The Commission was required to give public notice, hold
public hearings, and make a formal report, with recommendations, to
the President.
The Act of February 29, 1936,1' amended Section 22 to bring within
its protection the programs under the Soil Conservation and Domestic
Allotment Act which had assumed greatly increased importance following
invalidation by the Supreme Court of some of the basic features of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act.' 4
The first formal investigation under Section 22 (in 1939) was concerned
with cotton and cotton products. Cotton was subject to a program
under the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act,' 5 but the
investigation of imports was occasioned, not so much because of this
program, but because the Secretary of Agriculture had initiated an
export-subsidy program. The export-subsidy program was not then
entitled to protection under Section 22, but the Tariff Commission found
that imports were interfering not merely with that program but also
with the Domestic Allotment program. The Commission accordingly
recommended that the President impose import quotas. 6 The President
did so, and the quotas are still in effect, although the investigation has
been reopened several times to examine one facet or another of the
problem in the light of changed circumstances. One result of the cotton
investigation was an indication of the inadequacy of Section 22-its
10

48 STAT. 196, § 3(e) (1933).

11 49 STAT. 773 (1935),

7 U.S.C. § 624 (1946),

enacted August 24, 1935.

12 Exec. Order No. 7233, Nov. 23, 1935.
13 49 STAT.

1152 (1936),

7 U.S.C. § 624 (1946).

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
:1549 STAT. 163 (1935), as amended by 49 STAT. 1151 (1936), 16 U.S.CA. c. 3B (Supp.
'4

1950).
16 UNITED STATES TARE? ComwssloN, REPORT No. 137 (2d Ser. 1939).
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failure to provide direct protection for subsidy programs. The 1935 law
which had established Section 22 also contained provisions for financial
assistance to agriculture, including export subsidies, and appropriated
30 per cent of the customs revenues for that purpose. 7 The Congress
had not, in 1935, recognized that import controls might be needed to
protect the subsidy programs but within a year after the Tariff Commission's report on cotton Section 22 was amended to bring these
programs within its purview. 18 Further developments of Section 22
will be discussed hereinafter. First, however, the relevant trade agreements of the prewar period should be reviewed.
PREWAR TRADE AGREEMENTS

The trade agreements negotiated by the United States in the 1930's
were primarily designed to lower import tariffs. They also included
general provisions against quotas on products included in the agreements.
However, the prewar agreements implicitly acknowledged that imports
might interfere with our domestic agricultural programs and that it
might be necessary to restrict imports notwithstanding that tariff concessions on the particular products were in effect. Therefore, the agreements permitted quotas on imports of products on which concessions
were granted when such imports interfered with domestic programs
which included price supports or production or marketing restrictions. The provision of the 1935 agreement with Canada' 9 was typical
with respect to permissible import quotas. It read as follows:
The foregoing provision [prohibiting quotas on concession products]
shall not apply to quantitative restrictions in whatever form imposed by
either country on the importation or sale of any article the growth, produce
or manufacture of the other country in conjunction with governmental
measures operating to regulate or control the production, market supply,
or prices of like domestic articles, or tending to increase the labor costs
of production of such articles.
It is clear that the price-support programs with which we are concerned
do operate to regulate or control prices and that, accordingly, the prewar
agreements permitted the United States to impose quotas on imports
of competitive products during the effectiveness of the commitment not
to raise the tariff on the particular product. Thus these agreements
recognized the possible need of restricting imports when we have price
supports in effect for the comparable domestic products. There was,
17 49 STAT. 774 (1935), 7 U.S.C. § 612(c) (1946).
18 54 STAT. 17 (1940), 7 U.S.C.A. § 624 (Supp. 1950).
19 49 STAT. 3963, Art. VII (1935).
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however, no need for the United States to invoke these exceptions during
the pre-war period on account of direct price-support programs. The
two principal reasons were: (a) The price supports were at relatively
low levels, considering the rates of duty in effect at that time, and (b)
the direct price supports were limited to relatively few commodities
and there were but few trade-agreement reductions in tariff on imports
directly competitive with these commodities. There were only two
instances in which the United States imposed import quotas to sustain
domestic agricultural programs in which the exception needed to be
relied on. Neither of these programs provided for direct price support
by surplus removal operations. In both cases the quotas on imports
were in force before the tariff concessions were granted and the negotiators
knew that the quotas would be continued as long as needed to support
the domestic programs.
The first case involved Cuban sugar. Under the Jones-Costigan Act
(the Sugar Act) of 1934,20 quotas were imposed on the marketing of
domestic sugar, as well as on imports. In the trade agreement with Cuba,
the duty on imports was reduced but the agreement provided for termination of this tariff concession if the quota system should be terminated.,
The domestic price of sugar was dependent on administration of the
quotas, rather than on the import tariff or direct price-support operations.
Accordingly, the reduction in tariff brought about neither intensified
competition nor a saving to domestic consumers. The principal direct
effect of the reduction was that funds which would have otherwise
been collected by the United States Treasury as duties inured instead to
the Cubans. 2
The other instance involved cotton, referred to above. The quota was
imposed in 1939 to prevent interference with the program under the
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act (and the export-subsidy
program). In 1942, the duty was reduced on long-staple cotton in
negotiations with Peru. That the Peruvians understood the need for
continuation of the quota is evidenced by their request that it be put on
a global basis, rather than a country-by-country basis. This request was
granted.
20 48 STAT. 670 (1934).
21

49 STAT. 3638 (1934).

22 See Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H.

195 (1951).
2- 56 STAT. 1541; 56 STAT. 1963 (1942).

1612, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
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WARTIME POLICY CHANGES REGARDING PRICE SUPPORTS AND
TRADE AGREEMENTS

During World War II, there were two basic changes of policy important
to this discussion. First, the levels of agricultural price supports were
increased, with a promise of their continuation for two years after the
end of hostilities. Second, the Administration took steps to restrict the
scope of the trade-agreement exception which permitted the imposition
of import quotas to protect the domestic agricultural programs. In
order to encourage expanded production during the war, the Congress
provided for mandatory price supports on many non-basic agricultural
commodities as well as the basic commodities, increased the levels of
supports, and promised continuation of the supports for at least two
years after the end of the war.
With respect to effects on our foreign-trade policies, the Steagall
AmendmentF4 is probably the most important. This Amendment required
the Secretary of Agriculture to give public notice of those non-basic
commodities for which expansion of production was needed. Thereupon,
price support became mandatory. By an amendment in the Stabilization
Act of 1942,1 price support not less than 90 percent of parity was
guaranteed for at least two years after the war.
During the war, officials in the executive branch of the government
began formulation of new foreign-trade policies. These efforts culminated
in the proposed Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO).
The United States "Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and
Employment" were made public by the Department of State late in
1945.28 These Proposals included suggestions for the "substantial
reduction" of import tariffs and for a general rule against import quotas.
The Proposals suggested exceptions to the quota rule, permitting "import
quotas on agricultural products, imported in any form, necessary to
the enforcement of governmental measures which operate (a) to
restrict the quantities of like domestic products which may be marketed
or produced, or (b) to remove a temporary surplus of like domestic
products by making such surpluses available to certain groups of domestic
consumers free of charge or at prices below the current market level. ' 21
This was to be a permanent exception. An additional exception proposed,
to be effective only during the early postwar transitional period, was
24 55 STAT. 498 (1941), 15 U.S.C.A. § 713-a-8 (1948).
25 56 STAT. 768 (1942), 15 U.S.C.A. § 713-a-8 (1948).
26 U.S. DEP'T or STATE PuBLIcAION, No. 2411 (Commercial Policy Series No. 79, 1945).
27 Id. at 13.
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to permit import quotas essential to the orderly liquidation of temporary
surpluses of government stocks accumulated as a result of the war.
The latter exception was to take care of the postwar price supports.
In 1946, the Proposals were translated into a Draft Charter' and a
Preparatory Committee of several countries was established under the
auspices of the United Nations to further the project. The United States
invited the other countries represented on the Preparatory Committee
to engage in tariff-reduction negotiations concurrently with consideration
of the Draft Charter. The tariff negotiations were held in Geneva,
Switzerland, in 1947, concurrently with the final session of the Preparatory Committee. In the negotiations, the United States agreed to reduce
its import tariffs on many of the products directly competitive with
the commodities under price supports in this country. Such supports
were neither discontinued nor materially reduced at the end of the
two-year postwar period. The results of the tariff negotiations were
incorporated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 9 (GATT)
and for the most part became effective in 1948. GATT also contained
many of the general provisions which had been drafted for the ITO
Charter, including the rule regarding quotas and the exceptions regarding
domestic agricultural programs. The substance of this rule and its
exceptions is essentially that quoted above from the Proposals."
Some of the trade agreements which the United States had negotiated
before the war with countries which became parties to GATT were
terminated; others were suspended during the life of GATT. This is
important because our international obligations regarding quotas for
most of our imports are now governed by GATT rather than by bilateral
agreements. The bilateral agreements had prohibited quotas only on
products subject to tariff concessions and directly permitted quotas to
protect price-support programs. GATT prohibits quotas on all imports
and its permanent agricultural exception is limited to production or
marketing restriction programs and to "give-away" programs for "temporary" surpluses. GATT also contains a general "Escape Clause"
(Article XIX) permitting departure from commitments which result
in serious injury to domestic producers. Thus, if a tariff reduction results
in such an increase in imports as to cause serious injury, the tariff might
be raised above the level specified in the agreement. Or, if the rule
against quotas should result in increased imports and serious injury,
28 U. S. DEP'T or STATE PUBLICATION, No. 2598 (Commercial Policy Series No. 93, 1946).
29 61 STAT., Part 5 (1947).
SO Art. XI, 61 STAT., Part 5, p. A33; Aft. XX, 61 STAT., Part 5, p. A62 (1947).
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a quota might be imposed on imports. Article XIX makes no reference
to protecting governmental programs against nullification by imports,
but if the agreement causes injury to domestic producers as well as to a
government program, remedial action could be taken to stop the injury
to the producers. This would, to some extent at least, also protect the
governmental program.
One interesting question is whether there is serious injury to domestic
producers within the meaning of Article XIX if the primary result of
the trade-agreement concession is to increase the financial cost to the
government of maintaining the price-support program. It must be
remembered that Article XIX can be invoked only when the difficulty
arises from a commitment in the agreement. When import interference
with a price-support program does not result in any part from the
agreement, the procedure under this "Escape Clause" is not available.
GATT is now effective pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application 3 which permits quotas on imports if required by "existing" legislation which is inconsistent with the normal rules set forth in GATT.
"Existing" means the date of October 30, 1947, when the protocol was
signed by the representative of the United States. Thus, as long as the
protocol is in effect in this country, we could, consistently with GATT,
restrict imports if our statutes in effect on October 30, 1947, required
such restriction.
A full coverage of the Protocol of Provisional Application is not
within the scope of this paper. However, an illustration might be helpful
to an appreciation of its significance.
Section 22 as it existed on October 30, 1947, required the President
to restrict imports whenever he found them to be interfering with the
Agricultural Subsidy Programs operated under Section 32 of Public
Law Numbered 320 of the Seventy-fourth Congress, referred to above.
These programs included export subsidies as well as domestic subsidies
and many of them were not of the types specified in the main body of
GATT as a basis for restricting imports. Since these programs were
eligible for protection under Section 22 on October 30, 1947, the Protocol
of Provisional Application permits import quotas to protect them, even
though such quotas would conflict with GATT if it was definitively in
force.
However, the price-support programs initiated under the Steagall
Amendment and continued by postwar legislation were not entitled to
protection of Section 22 on October 30, 1947. Therefore, the Protocol
31

61

STAT.,

Part 6, p. A2051 (1947).
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of Provisional Application would not permit use of quotas to prevent
32
imports from nullifying these latter programs.
It is evident from the foregoing that the United States entered the
postwar period with an expanded price-support program; more products
were included than before the war and the levels of support were higher;
but our postwar international agreements were less tolerant of import
controls to support those programs.
POSTWAR CHANGES IN SECTION 22 OF THE A.A.A.
At war's end, Section 22 authorized import restrictions when needed
to protect programs under the original Agricultural Adjustment Act, the
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, or under Section 32 of
the 1935 law which set aside part of the Customs revenue for agricultural
subsidies. It was not applicable to the direct price-support programs
under the Steagall Amendment or other wartime legislation. Individual
members of Congress began to call attention to this deficiency in 1945,11
but it was not until 1947 that the Administration recommended expansion
of Section 22 to bring the direct price-support programs within its protection34 and not until 1948 that the legislation was enacted.
In the Agricultural Act of 1948", the Congress provided for continuation of the price-support programs and amended Section 22 to bring
all such programs under its protection. 6 This section was amended to
include "any loan, purchase, or other program or operation undertaken by
the Department of Agriculture, or any agency operating under its direction." But at the same time, a new subsection was added to Section 22
as follows: "(f) No proclamation under this section shall be enforced in
contravention of any treaty or other international agreement to which
the United States is or hereafter becomes a party.""1 This was the first
legislation which expressly recognized the possible conflict between our
agricultural programs and the trade-agreements program. The language
of the law seemed clearly to resolve the conflict in favor of the latter.
32 The Steagall commodities were brought within the scope of Section 22 by the Act
of July 3, 1948, which, however, forbade use of Section 22 in contravention of international
agreements. This law is referred to hereinafter.
33 See remarks of Rep. Frank Carlson, 91 CONG. REc, 5054-5 (1945).
34 Letter dated Feb. 4, 1947, from the Secretary of Agriculture to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
85 62 STAT. 1247 (1948), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1282 (Supp. 1950).
36 62 STAT. 1248 (1948), 7 U.S.C.A. § 624 (Supp. 1950).
37 This language was recommended by the Secretary of Agriculture after clearance of
his proposal to expand Section 22 with other interested government agencies, including the
State Department.
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Note especially that the Congress forbade import controls not only when
they conflicted with existing agreements but also when they might conflict
with future agreements and that these agreements were not limited to
those requiring Senate ratifications or Congressional approval.
GATT had been formally proclaimed by the President several months
before enactment of Section 22(f) and the Congress is charged with
constructive knowledge that GATT had seemingly narrowed the field in
which import quotas might be used to protect domestic agricultural
programs. However, one might be pardoned for doubting that many of
the individual members of Congress actually appreciated the significance
of GATT at that time. Indeed, two years later the Departments of State
and Agriculture were at odds over whether the domestic programs on tree
nuts warranted import restrictions consistently with GATT."
The language of Subsection (f) was clear. Regardless of whether
they might be necessary to protect domestic price-support programs,
import quotas could not be enforced in contravention of GATT or any
subsequent amendment thereof. Here, then, were striking contrasts.
Before 1948, our domestic law (Section 22) was inadequate because it
did not apply to our principal post-war price-support programs, but our
then-effective trade agreements permitted import quotas to protect our
domestic programs. However, in the Act which brought all price-support
programs within the scope of Section 22, the Congress forbade protection
if it should be contrary to trade agreements-and the new agreement
(GATT) narrowed the field of permissible action.
As now enforced, most price-support programs do not involve either
restrictions on production or marketing or differential-price programs for
disposal of temporary surpluses as referred to in GATT. Accordingly,
GATT forbids import controls for most products, except on a temporary
basis or under special waiver, as under Article XX," or Article XXV40
of GATT.
The new Subsection (f) of Section 22 did not long go unchallenged.
In 1950, during consideration of a bill to continue the price-support
programs, the Senate adopted an amendment to reverse the original
decision which had resolved the conflict in favor of trade agreements.4 '
It voted to amend Section 22(f) to read as follows:
(f) No international agreement hereafter shall be entered into by the
88
39
40
41

Hearings, supra note 6, at 77-80.
61 STAT., Part 5, p. A62 (1947).
61 STAT., Part 5, p. A68 (1947).
91 CONG. REc. 8171 (1950).
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United States, or renewed, extended, or allowed to extend beyond its per-

missible termination date in contravention of this section.
This amendment would have clearly subordinated the trade-agreements
program to the price-support program. Although there was dispute as
to whether the amendment conflicted with GATT, it did seem to say clearly that nothing should be done in our international agreements which restricted our freedom of action to control imports when they impinged on
our domestic agricultural programs. As passed by the House, the bill
had not contained the amendment, so it was sent to a conference committee of the House and Senate. The conferees adopted substitute language which had been prepared by the State Department, 42 completely
rewriting the amendment. The final version read as follows:
(f) No proclamation under this section shall be enforced in contravention of any treaty or other international agreement to which the United
States is or hereafter becomes a party; but no international agreement or
amendment to an existing international agreement shall hereafter be entered
into which does not permit the enforcement of this section with respect to
the articles and countries to which such agreement or amendment is applicable to the full extent that the general agreement on tariffs and trade,
as heretofore entered into by the United States, permits such enforcement
with respect to the articles and countries to which such general agreement
is applicable. Prescription of a lower rate of duty for any article than
that prescribed by the general agreement on tariffs and trade shall not,
if subject to the escape provisions of such general agreement, be deemed
a violation of this subsection. 43
Thus, the conference version restored the language of the prior law
prohibiting protection of domestic price-support programs if protection
required contravention of existing or future international agreements.
It did make one concession to the agricultural programs by saying that
future agreements should not narrow the agricultural quota exceptions
any further than they had been narrowed by GATT. In effect, however,
the final sentence of the amendment permitted the reduction of import
tariffs on price-supported products if such reduction was subject to the
general escape clause. This seemed to be a Congressional caution against
tariff reductions which might hurt agricultural producers. The amendment indicated no concern over the fact that tariff reductions might increase the cost to the government of maintaining price supports. In
sum, the 1950 amendment seemed to be an endorsement of tariff reductions within the framework of GATT, plus an acknowledgment that
GATT afforded adequate leeway for controlling imports which interfere
with price-support programs.
42 Hearings,supra note 6, at 1191.

43 Pub. L. No. 579, 81st Cong., § 3, 64

STAT.

261, 7 U.S.C.A. § 624 (1950).
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RECENT TRADE-AGREEMENT LEGISLATION

The question of conflict between tariff reductions and price supports
was most clearly presented during consideration of the 1951 legislation
to continue the trade-agreements program.4 4 During consideration in the
House of Representatives, an amendment was offered to forbid application of a reduced tariff to any agricultural commodity for which price
support is available unless the duty-paid price of the imported commodity exceeds the level of price support.' Supporters of this amendment argued that it was nonsense to encourage imports while the government is removing domestic surpluses from the market in order to support
the price, and that the imports required destruction of additional quantities of domestic commodities. Trade-agreement proponents in the House
opposed the amendment, arguing that GATT contained ample leeway for
controlling imports. To this it was replied that if GATT did permit
controls they were not being enforced and it was necessary for Congress
to take action. The House adopted the amendment by a vote of 124 to
110.
At the hearings on the bill before the Senate Finance Committee, the
Administration, speaking through the Secretary of Agriculture, opposed
the amendment as ill-suited to deal with the problem and as likely to
jeopardize the benefits which the trade-agreements program had obtained
for agriculture. Secretary Brannan thought that the GATT exceptions
for controlling imports were adequate and that the actual conflict between trade agreements and price supports had been greatly exaggerated.40 The Senate Finance Committee decided that changes in the
law were needed in the interests of protecting the agricultural programs
from harmful imports. However, the Committee did not agree with the
House bill, and substituted different provisions. In lieu of the House
amendment, the Finance Committee recommended improved procedures
for invoking the "escape clause" of trade agreements, an expeditious
procedure for invoking Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
in the case of perishable commodities, and a rewriting of Section 22(f)
to provide that international agreements shall not stand in the way of
remedial action under Section 22.
The "escape clause" was written into the statute. Previously it had
been the subject only of executive order and international negotiation.
44 H.R. 1612, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
45 97 Cong. Rec. 1118 (Feb. 7, 1951).
46 Hearings, supra note 6, at 57 et seq.
47 Say. R . No. 299, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
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Further, investigations were required to be made by the Tariff Commission, thereby eliminating the Commission's previous discretion. Certain evidentiary factors relating to the question of injury were prescribed*
and the Commission and the President were required to explain why
relief should be denied in particular cases. The normal procedure under
Section 22 requires an initial recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture to the President that an investigation by the Tariff Commission
is desirable. This recommendation is customarily cleared by the White
House staff with other interested agencies, including the State Department, before the President directs the Commission to investigate. Not
until the President so directs can the Commission institute its investigation. After the investigation is ordered, the Commission must give
reasonable public notice and hold a public hearing. After the hearing,
the Commission completes its investigation, formulates its findings, and
sends its report, with recommendations, to the President. The Finance
Committee recommended a short-circuiting of this procedure for perishable agricultural commodities. It decided that the Secretary of Agriculture should report simultaneously to the President and the Tariff
Commission when perishability required immediate action and that the
President should take action within twenty days, either with or without
a report from the Tariff Commission. The same procedure was prescribed
for "escape clause" actions involving perishables.
Finally, the Finance Committee decided that Section 22(f) should be
amended to read as follows: "No trade agreement or other international
agreement heretofore or hereafter entered into by the United States shall
be applied in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of this section."
The Chairman of the Finance Committee explained to the Senate that
the House amendment regarding price supports was omitted because it
was impossible of administration and, if put into effect, would result in
loss of concessions on our agricultural exports, which, in the case of pricesupported commodities, were five times as much as imports. Furthermore, that the amendments recommended by the Committee would adequately cover the problem. With regard to Section 22(f) as previously
enacted he stated: "Its elimination is absolutely necessary. ' 48 The
Senate adopted the amendments recommended by the Finance Committee' and passed the bill.
Thus the Senate again voted to subordinate the trade-agreements pro48 97 Cong. Rec. 5736-7 (May 22, 1951).
49 97 Cong. Rec. 5622-3 (May 21, 1951).
40 97 Cong. Rec. 5866 (May 23, 1951).
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gram to the domestic agricultural programs. Where conflicts developed
in actual practice, the President was directed to take action to support
the latter. The bill, however, was drafted to encourage action compatible
with foreign commitments wherever possible.0 ' The writer presumes that
where imports need to be restricted in contravention of an agreement,
the President would froceed to obtain from the other country or countries
a waiver of the obligation, as under Art. XXV of GATT. 2 The conference committee of the House and Senate approved the substance of the
Senate amendments above referred to0 31 and the conference report was
approved by both Houses." The Trade Agreements Extension Act of
1951 was approved by the President on June 16, 1951.11
'It seems inevitable that there be conflict of principles growing out of
various national policies. As frequently happens, the Congress has in
this case overlooked them until a conflict developed in actual practice.
When the practical conflict was made clear to the Congress, the decision
was made to favor the domestic agricultural program, but also to carry
on the international program insofar as it does not come into actual
conflict with the domestic program. Section 10 of the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1951 disavows Congressional approval or disapproval
of GATT, but the complete revision of Section 22 (f) of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act is inevitably a disapproval of part of the agreementthe provisions of Article XI which limit import controls which may be
needed to protect our price support programs. The Congress has now
clearly declared that such import controls shall be used whenever necessary, whether or not they are permissible under our international agreements. It may be concluded that the Congress has voted in favor of the
prewar type of trade-agreement provision relating to agricultural quotas
and has rejected the postwar type as found in GATT.
51 SEN. REP. No. 299, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1951).
02 61 STAT., Part 5, p. A68 (1947).

53 H. R. REP. No. 537, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The only change in the agricultural
amendment was to substitute 25 days for 20 days as the maximum time for taking action
on perishables.
54 97 Cong. Rec. 6094 (May 29, 1951), Id. at 6307 (June 5, 1951).
55 Pub. L. No. 50, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 65 STAT. 72 (1951).

